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Pawnbroker Regulation and the Pennsylvania Act
Many of the legal aspects of the pawnbroking business and its regulation
involve the practical application of well-settled principles of wider fields of
law. The law of pledges, for instance, having had its origin in this business 1
still plays an important part in the pawnbroker's conduct. A full treatment
of this subject, however, would be impossible here, and an inadequate study
one of little value. Moreover, recent judicial and legislative action has not
produced material changes. The bulk of this note will be concerned with
the more controversial issues of regulation which are now being discussed
by the appellate courts and which will confront them in the future.
Fundamentally, the contention over regulation has sprung from the
relationship of the social and economic objectives of pawnbroking legislation
and the efficacy of the legislation enacted for these purposes. For example,
it is admitted that the pawnbroker and his customer are not on equal bar-
gaining terms.2 The pawnbroker's place of business is generally known as
the "poor man's bank"." Ordinarily the pledger is one whose capital is
insufficient to enable him to borrow money from banks or small loan com-
panies, and who by necessity must use his personal belongings to acquire
cash. The usual pledge is one urged by immediate need. Because of this
the customer is likely to sacrifice fair value and reasonable terms for a ready
advance.4  So the first objective of the regulation of pawnbrokers is to
protect the poor from harsh contract terms.5 But, as we shall see, in pro-
tecting the poor, the freedom of conducting business is restricted for the
loan brokers; and, as in most cases of restraining legislation, issue is taken
as to whether the interests of both parties have been adequately considered.8
Very often the courts maintain that the sole reason for regulation is
crime prevention.7 The nature of the pawnbroking business is such that it
is often employed by thieves to dispose of the fruits of their crimes.8 Since
the pawnbroker has no certain means of knowing the true owner of the
I. See Foster's Application, 23 Pa. Dist. 558, 559 (1914) ; see COBB=IT, THE LAW
OF PAWNS OR PLEDGES (1841) I; TuRNER, THE CONTRACr OF PAWN (2d ed. 1883) z-6.
2. See Lowry v. Collateral Loan Ass'n., 172 N. Y. 394, 398, 65 N. E. 206, 207
(192) ; Ex parte Lichtenstein, 67 Cal. 359, 361, 7 Pac. 728, 730 (1885).
3. Equitable Loan Society v. Bell, 14 A. (2d) 316, 323 (Pa. Sup. Ct. i94o).
4. "Men driven by the necessities of their situation resort to the pawnbroker, and
pledge any and all articles in their possession in order to raise money, and they are not
particular about the rate of interest charged them." Morrison, C. J., in Ex parte Lich-
tenstein, 67 Cal. 359, 361, 7 Pac. 728, 730 (1885).
5. See graphic description of the purposes of small loan legislation in RYAN, UsuRY
AND USURY LAWS (1924) 13, 15, and a discussion in Lowry v. Collateral Loan Ass'n.,
172 N. Y. 394, 398, 65 N. E. 206, 207 (1902). See also the report of the English Select
Committee of 187o on Pawnbroking in BRULOT, BARGAINS WITH MoNEY-LENDERs (2d
ed. 19o6) 26; Cf. PRENTICE, POLICE POWER (1894) 43.
6. In holding invalid a regulation which prohibited pawnbrokers from selling
pledges within twenty-four hours after they had been received, Morrison, J., said of the
rule, "This is not a regulation of the business of the pawnbroker, but an unjustifiable
interference with the owner's right of property." Fulton v. Dist. of Columbia, 2 App.
D. C. 431 (1894). See City of Butte v. Paltrovich, 30 Mont. 18, 23, 75 Pac. 521, 522
(i9o4) ; Shuman v. City of Fort Wayne, 127 Ind. io9, 116, 26 N. E. 560, 562 (i89x).
7. See City of Wichita v. Wolkow, Iio Kan. 127, 128, 202 Pac. 632, 633 (921);
City of Grand Rapids v. Braudy, 105 Mich. 670, 675, 64 N. W. 29, 31 (1895) ; Eisner
Brothers v. Hawkins, 113 Va. 47, 49, 73 S. E. 479, 480 (1912).
8. See City of St. Joseph v. Levin, 128 Mo. 588, 594, 31 S. W. 101, 103 (I895);
RABY, THE REGULATION OF PAWNBROKING (1924) 5.
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pawn, and the dishonest pawnbroker has little concern as to who it might
be, protection of the honest pawnbroker and the public must lie behind the
shield of the state and municipal police forces.9 With the growth of organ-
ized crime in the United States more stringent police regulation is required
and such protection is best provided not only by facilitating the tracing of
stoleri or lost property but by guaranteeing the character of the pawnbrokers
themselves. This too, of course, is placing a burden on the business, and
legislation must be carefully designed so as not to make the burden unrea-
sonable.
It is a noteworthy fact that in every jurisdiction in which the pawn-
broking business has flourished to any extent, it has been submitted to some
form of regulation.10 For the most part this was limited to the rates of
interest charged, 1 but often it was of broader extent.12 Not only was this
the effect of the desire of legislators to protect the borrowers, but also of
the popular identification of pawnbrokers with usurers, and national preju-
dices against pawnbrokers as a class. 8 In the United States, however,
legislation, if any, has been of very limited form in the majority of states.2
4
Doubtless this legislative inactivity was due to nineteenth century reluctance
to restrict free enterprise in addition to the small necessity for severe
regulation. Since pawnbroking thrives in metropolitan areas, it was not
common in many states ;15 likewise crime was not organized on its present
day scale. In recent years the increasing need for regulation has been
recognized and comprehensive statutes have been enacted in the more
densely populated states.' 6
In the large majority of cases, the courts have upheld the validity of
even the more restrictive of the pawnbroker statutes and ordinances.1
7
9. See City of Kansas City v. Gamier, 57 Kan. 412, 415, 46 Pac. 707, 7o8 (1896),
in which Johnston, J., says of the pawnbroker acts: "They are intended for the protec-
tion of the public, and they also tend to protect the pawnbroker himself from imposition
and loss." See also RABY, op. cit. supra note 8, at 8.
io. See TuRNm, op. cit. supra note i, at pp. 1-24.
ii. In early times pawbroking came under the general usury laws. See BELLoT,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 2; TuRNER, op. cit. supra note i, at 6.
12. Even in the time of Moses pawnbrokers were forbidden to accept certain kinds
of pledges. EXOD. xxii, 25, 27; cf. JoE, xxii, 5, 6. The first English statute dealing
specifically with pawnbrokers was I JAc. I, cap. 21 (a) providing that the property of
the owner of stolen goods was not lost by pawning. Complete regulation was first en-
acted in England in 1757. TURNER, op. cit. supra note i, at 9.
13. This was a result of the theory dating back to primitive civilization that it was
dishonorable to charge for the loan of money, labor or a chattel to a fellow citizen.
BELLoT, op. cit. supra note 5, at i. The effect of this was to place the business of money-
lending and pawnbroking in the hands of foreigners. The taking of interest was not
permitted in England until 1546. TURNER, op. cit. supra note i, at 6.
14. RABY, op. cit. supra note 8, at 8.
15. Of the i5o to 175 pawnbroking establishments in the State of Pennsylvania,
about ioo are located in Philadelphia. Equitable Loan Society v. Bell, 14 A. (2d) 316,
317 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 194o).
6. CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, 1931) tit. 429, Act 5824, 5825, §§ 1-16, Act 5824
as superseded by CAL. PENAL CODE (Deering, 1931) tit. 9, c. II, §§ 338-344, Act 5825
as amended by CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, Supp. 1933) tit. 429, Act-5825, §§ 1-24;
ILL. Rzv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 74, §§ 14-25, and the latest act, PA. STAT. ANN. (Pur-
don, Supp. 1939) tit. 63, § 281.
17. Ex parte Lichtenstein, 67 Cal. 359, 7 Pac. 728 (1885) (statute limiting rate
of interest held constitutional) ; Commonwealth v. Danziger, 176 Mass. 290, 57 N. E.
461 (1goo) (license statute held valid) ; Grand Rapids v. Braudy, 105 Mich. 67o, 64
N. W. 29 (895) (statute requiring license and bond held valid). Similar ordinances
enacted by various municipalities have also been sustained. Launder v. Chicago, iii
Ill. 291 (1884); Shuman v. Fort Wayne, 127 Ind. 109, 26 N. E. 56o (18go); Hyman
v. Boldrick, 153 Ky. 77, 154 S. W. 369 (1913) ; St. Joseph v. Levin, 128 Mo. 588, 31
S. W. 101 (1895). But the power to regulate the pawnbroking business must have
been delegated by the state. State v. Itzkovitch, 49 La. Ann. 366, 21 So. 544 (1897).
io6 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Most recently, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court so held in Equitable Loan
Society v. Bell."8 By virtue of their police power, it is held that the states
may impose regulations on the pawnbroking business, or delegate that
power to municipalities.' 9 But while the courts have been definite in up-
holding the states' right to regulate the business, they have not clearly
outlined the limitations of its exercise. Thus the basic questions arise,
would the state by virtue of its police power be able to prohibit the business
entirely, or impose such unreasonable regulations that they would tend to
discourage anyone from entering into or continuing in that occupation?
The answers to these depend in large measure upon the nature of the busi-
ness. Unquestionably the state has the power to prohibit some businesses
and not others.20  How then are we to classify pawnbroking? Obviously
there is an economic necessity for an agency by which persons reduced to
personal possessions can borrow money.21 But, as has been pointed out,
there is a likelihood that the unequal bargaining position of pawnbroker
and customer will lead to excessive terms in favor of the pawnbroker;
22
and also that the criminal will use this agency to dispose of his loot.
23
These, however, are mere possibilities-abuses that do not appear to be so
intimately associated with the pawnbroking business that they can be pre-
vented only by prohibition.24  Justification of prohibition of a business
would seem to depend more on its inherent nature.2 5  But the legislature
itself has recognized that lending money and taking interest are not so
injurious to the public welfare that they could be abolished. 2  Not since
medieval times has it been held otherwise ;27 and no jurisdiction in this
country has attempted to abolish the business on these grounds.28  Justice
Butler, speaking of pawnbroking in Asakura v. Seattle, 9 was able to say:
"We have found no state legislation abolishing or forbidding this busi-
ness".30 Of course the fact that no jurisdiction has ever attempted to
abolish the business does not preclude its right to do so; and had the
attempt been made some courts might not question the exercise of legislative
discretion.3 ' But it is submitted that in view of the innocent nature of the
18. I4 A. (2d) 316 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 194o). See (194o) 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 117.
ig. See cases cited in note 17 sup-a. See also Wichita v. Wolkow, i1O Kan. 127,
202 Pac. 632 (1921) ; Eisner Brothers v. Hawkins, ii3 Va. 47, 73 S. E. 479 (1912).
2o. See dissenting opinion of Justice Stern in Equitable Loan Society v. Bell, 24
A. (2d) 36, 323 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1940); 2 COOLEY, CONsnrurioNAL LImTA IO NS (8th
ed. 1927) chap. xvi and cases cited therein; FREUND, POLICE PowER (1904) §§ 58-61;
TIEDfMAN, POLICE POWER (1886) § 302; Legis. (1938) 25 VA. L. REV. 219.
21. COBB=IT, op. cit. supra note I, at 28, 29; RYAN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 137,
238; TURNER, op. cit. .upra note I, at 24.
22. See note 4 supra.
23. See note 8 supra.
24. Dissenting opinion of Stern, J., in Equitable Loan Society v. Bell, I4 A. (2d)
316, 323 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 294o).
25. If it is of such a nature that its prohibition would be for the benefit of the pub-
lic health, safety, morals or general welfare, its prohibition is valid. 2 COOLEY, op. cit.
supra note 20, at 1328; FREUND, op. cit. supra note 2o, at 59.
26. On the contrary the legislatures have not only established legal rates of interest
but provided for special higher rates of interest for small loan companies, etc., thereby
encouraging this type of money-lender. RYAN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 138.
27. See notes 12 and 13 supra.
28. Note, however, that the City of Chicago was given the power to "license, tax,
regulate, suppress and prohibit . . . pawnbrokers." [Launder v. City of Chicago,
III Ill. 291, 295 (1884)] although the city did not attempt to exercise their authority
to a greater extent than regulation.
29. 265 U. S. 332 (924).
30. Id. at 343.
31. Courts are reluctant to upset the decision of the legislature in the exercise of
its police power. 2 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 2o, at 1225.
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business and the adequacy of regulation to eliminate the evils likely to
arise, legislation prohibiting the business would be an arbitrary and oppres-
sive exercise of the police power of the state.3 2  The majority opinion in
the Equitable Loan Society case, however, stated that the legislature could
abolish the business if it desired and argued from this that it could impose
unreasonable regulations.33 This raises the second problem-must the reg-
ulations be reasonable? The argument of the Pennsylvania court that they
need not since the states can abolish the business entirely is based on an
assumption which, as has been shown above, has not been acted upon by a
legislature or a court.3 4 Even assuming the truth of the court's premise,
the conclusion is not inevitable. It is entirely possible that prohibition of a
business might bear a reasonable relation to the public welfare and thereby
be valid, whereas regulations imposed might not and so be invalid. Of
course, if certain regulations were found to be necessary for the protection
of the public although they were incidentally restrictive of the pawnbroking
business, they would nevertheless be held valid. 86 But the fact that the
courts have not upheld pawnbroker statutes or ordinances which they
admitted were unreasonable 3 7 is not only in contradiction to the opinion
of the Pennsylvania court but is an indication that such regulation is not
necessary for the proper control of the pawnbroking business. 8
LICENSING AND SUPERVISION
As has been pointed out, the good character of the pawnbroker is
important in the protection of the public. To insure this, much depends on
32. Ibid. "The correct constitutional principle seems to be that a business serving
valuable economic or social purposes may not be entirely prohibited, because it is at-
tended with danger or liable to abuse, but that the policy of prohibition may be sus-
tained, if the business exists only for the gratification of pleasure, or has otherwise no
legitimate function." FRE ND, op. cit. supra note 2o, at 54. See Legis. (1938) 25 VA.
L. REV. 239, 223.
33. "But even if confiscation had been shown, it would have made no difference,
because the Commonwealth under its police power can prohibit the pawnbroking busi-
ness entirely." Drew, J., in Equitable Loan Society v. Bell, 14 A. (2d) 316, 38 (Pa.
Sup. Ct. 94o).
Note that "unreasonable" as used in this note means unnecessarily restrictive of
the pawnbroker's conduct of business rather than lacking a resonable relation to the pro-
tection of public welfare.
34. In view of the economic necessity for pawnbrokers, see note 23 supra, and the
adequacy of regulation to check the likely abuses, see infra.
35. Even Justice Drew recognized the fact that although a legislature may entirely
prohibit a particular business, if it chooses to regulate it the regulation must be reason-
able, and not discriminatory. He qualifies his first statement, quoted in note 33 supra,
by adding: "Plaintiffs cannot, therefore, successfully claim a violation of their funda-
mental rights because of a regulation, failing short of complete suppression, which is
not arbitrary, nor discriminatory, and which bears a reasonable relation to a proper
legislative purpose." (Italics added.) Equitable Loan Society v. Bell, 14 A. (2d) 316,
38 (Pa. Sup. Ct i94o).
36. 2 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 20, at 1225.
37. Even though the City of Chicago had been delegated the power to prohibit
pawnbrokers by its charter, see note 28 supra, nevertheless in Kuhn v. Chicago, 30 Ill.
App. 203 (1889) the court upheld a pawnbroker ordinance in that city on the ground
of reasonableness.
For other examples of the use of the "reasonable" standard in pawnbroking regu-
lation, see McQuillin, Some Observations Relative to the Regulation of Pawnbroking
(i9o6) 63 CENT. L. J. 107, io9; Fulton v. Dist. of Columbia, 2 App. D. C. 431, 438
(894) ; Kansas City v. Gamier, 57 Kan. 412 (1896) ; Grand Rapids v. Braudy, io5
Mich. 67o, 64 N. W. 29, 32 (3895); St. Paul v. Lytle, 69 Minn. 1, 71 N. W. 7o3
(3897) ; Butte v. Paltrovich, 3o Mont i8, 23, 75 Pac. 521, 522 (I9o4).
38. "These evils, however, are amenable to corrective regulation ... " Stem,
I., dissenting in Equitable Loan Society v. Bell, i4 A. (2d) 316 (Pa. Sup. Ct. i94o).
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the licensing regulation.8 9 Even the earliest enactments required a license
as a condition precedent to pawnbroking and in many instances required a
surety bond. 0 But there are many variations in present-day statutes. Some
states, for example, place the issuing of licenses entirely within the discre-
tion of municipal or county officials;41 other states delegate this office to
state departments. 2  Often both state and municipality have concurrent
jurisdiction and exact license fees.43  Some of the states vary the amount
of the license and bond according to the classes of cities or towns." Few
of the statutes prescribe any standard by which the licensing officials are
to grant or refuse permits, so that the license provisions amount to nothing
more than revenue measures. The Pennsylvania Act attempted to correct
this by providing:
"The Secretary of Banking shall have the power to reject any ap-
plication for license if he is satisfied that the financial responsibility,
experience, character, and general fitness of the applicant or applicants
is not such as to command the confidence of the community and to
warrant the conclusion that the business will be operated honestly,
fairly, and within the laws of this commonwealth, or if he is not satis-
fied that allowing such applicant to engage in business will promote
the convenience and the advantage of the community. . . ., 45
It is interesting to note that this section is more detailed than the corre-
sponding section of the Uniform Pawnbroking Bill drafted by the National
Federation of Remedial Loan Associations 48 which merely states:
"If such application (for license) be approved by the licensing official
he shall issue a license to the applicant. . , 47
Despite the fact that the Pennsylvania act allows the licensing official less
discretion than the Uniform Act in granting or refusing a license appli-
cation,4 s this section was strongly objected to by counsel for the plaintiff
39. RABY, op. cit. supra note 8, at 5.
40. Typical of these was the Philadelphia ordinance of January i9, 1856, promul-
gated under a statute of 1823, empowering the city council to "pass such laws and ordi-
nances as they may, from time to time deem necessary for the good government and
control of pawnbrokers . . ." PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1931) tit 53, § 7601. By
this ordinance the Mayor of Philadelphia was to grant licenses upon payment of a fee
of $2oo, the filing of a $iooo bond and $5ooo insurance policy.
41. I CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §2945; DEL. Rnv. CODE (1935) § 1382; Ms. REv.
STAT: (930) C. 47, §1; 2 MASS. GEN. LAWs (1932) c. 140, § 7o; 8 Mo. STAT. ANN.
(1932) § 6171 (xvii), are a few statutes placing the duty of licensing in the hands of
local authorities.
42. ARiz. REv. Com (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 98I (7) and IND. STAT. ANN.
(Baldwin, Supp. 1935) § i322o-3, are typical of these statutes.
43. Ky. STAT. ANN. (Carroll's Baldwin, 1936) §§ 3011, 4224, specifically provides
that both state and municipality may exact license fees.
44. FLA. COMP. LAws ANN. (Skillmann, 1928) § 1237. Louisiana varies the license
fee according to the amount of capital invested. 6 LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart, 1939)
§ 8594.
45. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 63, § 281 (8).
46. This may be found reprinted in RABY, op. cit. supra note 8, at 32; RYAN, op.
cit. supra note 5, at 233.
47. Uniform Pawnbroking Bill § 5.
48. The Pennsylvania Act is somewhat similar to the requirements for license un-
der the Uniform Small Loan Laws. HTuACHEK, ANNOTATIONS ON SMALL LOAN
LAWS (1938) 5I. While no decision has tested the validity of the standards set forth
in the statute, or the exercise of discretion of the licensing official, in view of the worthy
purpose of these provisions of the statute, it is reasonable to believe that they will be
upheld. Similar licensing sections in other statutes have been sustained. See cases
cited id. at 55.
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pawnbrokers in the Equitable Loan Society case as being an unconstitu-
tional delegation of legislative power.49
Just as the regulations differ as to the requirements for a license so do
they in regard to the supervision of the business. Often the licensing and
regulation of the business are separated from the office of supervision."
And there is great variance as to the number and severity of the regulations
included in the statutes. Usually they provide that a weekly report be given
to the supervising official of the pledges received,5' often loans to minors
are forbidden 52 and the hours of business have been fixed. Most of these
provisions have been upheld by the courts on the ground of reasonableness. 3
Several of the pawnbroker statutes not only prescribe a number of police
regulations in the statute itself but allow for other rules within the discretion
of the licensing or the supervising official. 4 So the Pennsylvania Act per-
mits the Secretary of Banking to-
"issue such general rules and regulations as may be necessary for the
protection of the public and to insure the proper conduct of such busi-
ness, and for the enforcement of this act, which rules and regulations
shall have the force and effect of law." 55
While no decision has tested the validity of rules ordered by a supervising
official under such a statutory clause, it appears that they too would be
subject to the standard of reasonableness. 8
Naturally these regulations are burdensome to the pawnbroker causing
inconvenience by frequent examination of records, and increasing clerical
work by the reports required. But in view of the benefit they are designed
to effect, there should be little reason for complaint unless the statutes
become so burdensome that they are in effect prohibitive.
57
INTEREST AND CHARGES
Most likely to be the subject of controversy is the regulation of interest
and charges. This likelihood arises not only by reason of their importance
to the pawnbroker, but also from the difficulty of establishing rates which
will allow him a fair -return and at the same time protect the borrowers
from unconscionable bargains." It must be remembered that the pawn-
broker lends money on a pledge of personal property, and that consequently
49. Brief for Appellants, pp. 164, 168, Equitable Loan Society v. Bell, 14 A. (2d)
36 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 194o).
5o. Arizona and Louisiana, for example, require state officials to license pawnbrok-
ers. ARIz. REv. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 981 (7) ; 5 LA. GEN. STAT. ANN. (Dart,
1939) tit. 47, § 65.
5I. See, for example, ARiz. REV. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 4691; 1 CONN. GEN.
STAT. (1930) § 2948; 2 MASS. GEN. LAWS (93) c. 140, § 79.
52. IND. STAT. ANN. (Baldwin, Supp. 1935) § 7322o-36 (I); PA. SrAT. ANN.
(Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 63, § 281 (29). Cf. Uniform Pawbroking Bill § Io3 (I).
53. Launder v. Chicago, III Ill. 291 (1884), upheld an ordinance requiring pawn-
brokers to keep a register of pledges. Ordinances regulating the hours of business
were sustained as reasonable in Hyman v. Boldrick, 153 Ky. 77, 154 S. W. 369 (1913) ;
Butte v. Paltrovich, 3o Mont. 18, 75 Pac. 521 (19o4). Cf. Uniform Pawnbroking Bill
§ 703 (2). Fingerprinting of pledgers was upheld as a reasonable regulation in Wichita
v. Wolkow, Iio Kan. 127, 202 Pac. 632 (1921).
54. 2 CALIF. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1931) Act 5825, § 15; IND. STAT. ANN. (Bald-
win, Supp. 1935) § 13220-12. Cf. UNIFORM PAWNBROKING BILL § 12.
55. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 63, § 281 (8).
56. Cf. note 37 supra, and cases cited therein.
57. 2 COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 2o, at 1231.
58. How the market rate of interest fluctuates in spite of statutory maximum inter-
est laws is shown in RYAN, op. cit. supra note 5, at ii6, 117.
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his liabilities and duties are greater by virtue of his having received the
pawn than they would be on a mere loan of money. Thus, not only must
he be compensated for the loan of money he has made, but, since he must
properly care for the pawn and risk physical hazards as well as deprecia-
tion, there must be some allowance above interest made for storage and
insurance.5 9 Then too, there are more clerical duties attached to this busi-
ness than that of the small loan companies and banks. For these reasons
it was early recognized that the pawnbroker could not maintain his estab-
lishment under the ordinary legal contract rate of interest, and a different
rate was fixed for this trade.60 Many states have made allowance for the
added costs of pawnbroking,61 while others restrict the broker to the prevail-
ing contract rate. 2 In states that have not provided a higher rate by stat-
ute, the difference has been made up by charges including not only the
legal rate of interest, but in addition, specific fees for storage, insurance,
investigation and the like,6" so that in the usual case the cost to the pledger
is heavier than that permitted under the pawnbroker statutes, depending
upon the integrity of the pawnbroker. Again there is a wide division in
the rates allowed in the several states, and the interest permitted by statute
may range from 12 per cent. per annum 6 " to 126 per cent.65 While this
last figure may seem unjustifiably high, even that may be exceeded in those
states which have no statutory coverage of pawnbroking and depend merely
on the contract rate of interest for protection of the borrower.
66  Most of
the recent statutes have set 3 per cent. per month as the maximum charge,67
including interest and all other fees; and this was the rate suggested in the
Uniform Act.68 This rate is sometimes varied higher or lower according
to the size of the loan,69 or the nature of the pledge.70  The Pennsylvania
act is a modification of these in that it permits but 6 per cent. per year for
interest on the loan (the statutory contract rate), but establishes maximum
and minimum percentages for additional charges according to both the size
of the loan and the nature of the property pawned.71 Thus the total charges
59. RABY, op. cit. supra note 5, at 6.
6o. Ibid. Cf. RYAN, op. cit. supra note 5, at 138.
61. See, for example, 3 CoLo. ANN. STAT. (Courtright's Mills, 293o) c. i22, § 54oo;
DEm. Rav. CODE (935) § 1389; 9 MO. STAT. ANN. (1932) c. 130, §14269; 5 NEv.
CoMp. LAWs (HilIyer, 1929) § 10153. Massachusetts and New Hampshire leave the
regulation of the interest and charges wholly within the discretion of the licensing
board or official. 2 MAss. GEN. LAWS (93) c. 140, §72; i N. H. PuBLuc LAws
(1926) c. 272, § 20.
6:. Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mis-
sissippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming have
not as yet a special interest rate for pawnbrokers.
63. Sometimes the statutes make a distinction between the rate of interest and
other charges; and while the interest allowed is limited to the ordinary contract rate,
a certain percentage of the principal amount is permitted as compensation for the other
charges. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 63, § 281 (12) ; TENN. CODE ANN.
(Michie, Supp. 1937) § 6733.
64. By Act of Congress of February 4, 1913, 37 STAT. 657, the District of Colum-
bia allows only r% per month for pawnbrokers with extra charges forbidden.
65. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 2936) app. § 191.
66. See notes 62 and 63 supra.
67. 5 ORE. CODE ANN. (Supp. 1935) § 22-2826.
68. § 59.
6g. See CONN. GEN. STAT. (193o) § 295o; OHIO CODE ANN. (Throckmorton's
Baldwin, 194o) § 6339-3; R. I. GE, . LAWS (1938) c. 364, § 14.
7o. VA. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1936) app. § 191.
71. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit 63, § 282 (2), makes three classifi-
cations of charges: (a) on loans on jewelry in excess of $5o, (b) loans on jewelry of
less than $5o, and (c) all other loans.
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vary between 18 and 36 per cent. per annum of the principal amount, at the
discretion of the supervising official.
72
No attempt will be made at this point to suggest what the proper rate
of interest and charges might be. There are many fluctuating factors in-
volved. The costs of taking and caring for a pledge, the availability of
small loans in the locality in which the pawnbroking business is to be regu-
lated and a reasonable return for the lender are but a few of the factors which
must be studied in detail to determine an equitably accurate rate.73 The
question of what is a reasonable return 7 4 for the pawnbroker was in issue
in the Equitable Loan Society case, for the objection was made that the
rates of the Pennsylvania act were confiscatory.75 But the court in that case
avoided the issue by declaring that it was not necessary to decide whether
or not the rates were confiscatory inasmuch as the state could not only
regulate but abolish the business entirely.78 It is worthless to speculate
what a court which resiricted the regulation of pawnbroking to reasonable
regulation would decide as to the Pennsylvania rates. It is sufficient to
point out here, that in such a court such a test would be applied to interest
and charges rates and that there is no precedent 7 7 by which the results of
such a test can be shown.
RELATION TO THE SmALL LOAN LAWS
A most important and as yet little discussed problem involved in the
regulation of pawnbroking is its relation to small loan legislation. Few
fields of law have increased to as great an extent as small loan legislation
since the turn of the century. More than two-thirds of the states now have
small loan laws fashioned on the model of the Uniform Small Loan Act.78
Often the small loan laws are supplemented by other acts providing a
slightly wider coverage or applying to a particular type of lender. Thus in
Pennsylvania, there is extant not only the Pawnbroker Act, a small loan
law applying generally to loans up to $3o0,7 9 and a Consumer Discount
Company act for loans up to $Iooo,s0 but there are also other acts pertain-
ing to such lenders as banks and building and loan companies. 8 ' Within
such a mass of legislation on collateral subjects there is likely to be an over-
lapping or even a direct conflict, especially when the statutes have been
enacted at different times or without thought or reference to the others.
72. The Secretary of Banking is given the power to set the rates within the statu-
tory figures. Ibid. This also was objected to as an unconstitutional delegation of legis-
lative power and a denial of due process. Brief for Appellants, pp. 15o-I62, Equitable
Loan Society v. Bell, i4 A. (2d) 316 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 194o).
73. For a discussion of the factors involved in "consumers loans rates", see RYAN,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 145, 146.
74. What is a reasonable return was discussed at length in the railroad "rate" cases.
See HENDRICKS, THE POWER To REGULATE CORPORATIONS AND COMMERCE (igo6) 347-
355; TAYLOR, DUE PROCESS OF LAW (1917) §§ i88-igo.
75. Brief for Appellants, pp. 34-76, Equitable Loan Society v. Bell, 14 A. (2d)
316 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1940).
76. See notes 33 and 35 supra.
77. In Ex parte Lichtenstein, 67 Cal. 359, 7 Pac. 728 (i885), the court sustained
a statute limiting the interest and charges of pawnbrokers to 2% per month. How-
ever, the states right to impose any limitation and not the reasonableness of the rates
imposed was in issue. For this reason and because of the fluctuation of the interest
rates, this case can not be cited as establishing a reasonable rate for present-day pawn-
brokers.
78. Two excellent treatises on the statutes and cases in this field are CAMALIER,
DIGEST OF PERSONAL FNANCE LAWS (1932) and HUBACHEK, op. cit. supra note 48.
79. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1939) tit. 7, §§ 751-761.
80. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1939) tit. 7, §§ 761 (I to i9).
81. CAMALIER, op. cit. supra note 78, at 84'.
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Also there is always the danger of violation of the equal protection guar-
antee. Much of this depends on careful legislative draftsmanship, but even
with this, contention is probable. For example, the three Pennsylvania
laws (Small Loan, Consumer Discount Company and Pawnbroker License
Acts) were enacted by the same legislature in the same year.8 2 By the Con-
sumer Discount Company Act, the licensed lender is permitted
"A. To lend money, credit, goods or things in action in amounts
not exceeding one thousand dollars ($I,ooo) and charge interest and
fees herein provided.
B.To lend money on the security of real or personal property or
without security." ss
By the Small Loan law as amended in the same year in which the above
act was passed, the licensee can
". .. make a loan of money, credit, goods or things in action, in the
amount or of the value of three hundred ($300) dollars or less either
with or without security. ,, 84
and the Pawnbroker License Act defines pawnbroker as one who,
"(i) engages in the business of lending on the deposit or pledge of
personal property, other than choses in action, securities, or written
evidence of indebtedness .... ," 85
The confusion that is likely to result from these sections is obvious. On
pledges or loans on the security of personal property up to three hundred
dollars, any of the acts might be applied, depending on what the lender is
called. This anomalous situation was realized in part when the amendment
to the Small Loan Law came before the legislature 8 and they included in
that act with respect to licensing:
". .. the Secretary of Banking shall have the power to reject any
application for license . . . if it shall appear . . . that the business
of the applicant is, or is to be, substantially that generally conducted
by pawnbrokers." 87
And with regard to interest and charges in the Small Loan bill
"In the case of loans made upon the security of tangible personal
property, physical possession of which is taken by the licensee, the
licensee shall not charge interest at a rate in excess of such rates as
are provided for by the act, approved the sixth day of April (Pawn-
broker's License Act) . . . for loans of a similar character . ,, 8s
82. 1937. Note that the Small Loan Act was an amendment of the previous Act
of June 4, 1919, P. L. 375 [PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 7, § 751].
83. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1939) tit. 7, § 761 (W3).
84. Id. at § 75r.
85. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1939) tit. 63, §§ 281-
86. After discussing the similarity of the provisions of the Small Loans Act and the
Pawnbroker Act, Senator Shapiro of Philadelphia, speaking before the legislature, con-
cluded: "Unless, therefore, House Bill No. 44io (Pawnbroker Act) and the Small
Loans Bill are properly amended, one of two conditions will occur: either the Small
Loan broker will become a pawnbroker in fact, or the pawnbroker will become a small
loan broker as well, by merely paying a small additional license fee, he will be observ-
ing the Pawnbroker's Act on one side of his house, and legally violating its terms on
the other side. Obviously the legislature should not permit such an anomalous result;
and in my opinion it can be prevented only by simultaneous consideration of both bills,
since they both strike at the same evil." Pa. Legis. J., March 8, 1937, vol. i, p. i.
It is important to note that the senator made no reference to the similarity of the
provisions of the Pawnbroker Act and the Consumer Discount Company Act.
87. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1939) tit. 7, § 752.
88. Id. at § 755.
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But while the legislature was aware of the overlap of the small loan act and
the Pawnbroker License Act, and while they attempted a remedy, appar-
ently no thought was given to that of the Consumer Discount Company
Act and the Pawnbroker Act, 9 for the Consumer Discount Act permits
those companies licensed to make loans identical with those allowed under
the Small Loans Act and Pawnbroker Act. Yet while the legislature
revised the Small Loan Act to avoid this conflict, they did not include the
same provision in the Consumer Discount Company Act. The problem of
such an omission is created by the fact that the Consumer Discount Com-
pany Act permits a higher rate of interest and charges than the Pawnbroker
Act permits on identical pledges.90 Equal protection of the laws would only
be saved if the difference between the two acts can be said to be a reasonable
classification. To begin with, it must be repeated that the regulation of the
rates of both businesses is for the purpose of protecting the poor from
unfair bargains. What then can be said to be the basis for classification
of the two businesses in respect to rates when the very same transaction is
permissible under both statutes? 91 Not only does this difference seem to
rest on the difference in the letters of each name, but seems to bear very
little relation to the purpose of the statute, i. e. protection of the poor.
The court in the Equitable Loan Society case did not answer this
directly. Meeting the classification objection, it stated, without proof,'
that the legislature was aware of the common features of the statutes,9 2 and
then added: "In view of the conditions and temptations known to exist
in that business (pawnbroking), we cannot label the classification un-
reasonable." I' To be at all relevant the "conditions and temptations"
must have referred to the interest and charges imposed by pawnbrokers. It
is difficult to perceive how the same "conditions and temptations" would
not be present for the Consumer Discount companies in respect to usury
when the loan transaction and the customer are exactly the same as for the
pawnbroker. If the court's fact assumption is true this would seem to be a
better argument for the more careful supervision of pawnbrokers than for
such classification; and, moreover, such a decision would appear to increase
the "temptations" of pawnbrokers to exceed the legal rate of interest and
impose the same amount as rival consumer discount companies are allowed
by law. No doubt the greater part of the consumer discount business is
not in transactions similar to those common to the pawnbroking business,
and on that basis the courts might sustain the conflicting provisions of the
two measures as reasonable classification, the legislature being permitted
89. There is no evidence that the legislature was aware of it. See note 86 supra.
go. See a comparative table of rates under both acts in Brief for Appellants,. pp.
,74, 175, Equitable Loan Society v. Bell, 14 A. (2d) 316 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1940).
91. While HUBACHEK, op. cit. supra note 48, at i27, 130, cites a long list of cases
upholding the classification between the small loan laws and other types of lenders, he
states as a general principle: ". . . a state may deal with different classes of lenders
or borrowers or loan transactions in different ways provided that there is nothing ap-
parently unreasonable in the distinctions made between the different classes and that all
members of each class are treated alike." Id. at 127.
92. "The legislature was fully aware of the features now urged as being common to
all three businesses." Equitable Loan Society v. Bell, 14 A. (2d) 316, 320 (Pa. Sup.
Ct. 1940). In support of this statement the court cites the page of the Pennsylvania
Legislative Journal, quoted from note 86 supra. As stated in that note there is no
mention of the Consumer Discount Company Act in the senator's speech. It is signifi-
cant too, that the Small Loans Act was amended (notes 87 and 88 supra) after this
speech was made. So the authority that the court cites not only fails to prove the
court's statement but is a strong indication that if the legislature had been made aware
of the conflict as they were in regard to the Small Loan Act they would have
amended it.
93. Equitable Loan Society v. Bell, 14 A. (2d) 316, 320 (Pa. Sup. Ct. I94O).
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a wide latitude of judgment in this matter 4 It is sufficient to point out
that by sustaining such differentiation as this a more direct competition is
encouraged with the advantage on one side. Furthermore it would seem
valueless for a court to attempt to justify such action by the legislature,
when there is no convincing proof that they were aware of the result.95
This particular instance of statutory overlapping and the decision treat-
ing of it are dealt with at length here as an example of problems which will
arise in the future in other jurisdktions. More than likely they are even
more perplexing than those which faced the Pennsylvania court, for in this
state the three laws were enacted within a short period of time, while in
other states some fields of law are more comprehensively treated than others
according to the ages of the statutes. This misallocation of burdens is the
seed of equal protection and due process problems.
As to limits of classification, some indication as to results of cases in
the pawnbroking field is given by the decisions under the small loan laws. 6
Thus it has been held that classification based upon the size of the loan 'I
or the nature of the security pledged 98 is valid. Likewise different interest
rates may be established for the licensed or unlicensed lender,99 although
the more recent statutes forbid business entirely without a license. Finally,
classification according to the population of the various parts of the state
have been upheld.'
CONCLUSION
One of the few generalizations that can be made of the existing pawn-
broker statutes is that they are in need of reform. 01 The necessity of some
regulation is clear; and the right of the states to regulate under their police
power has been sustained often. The difficulties are mainly delineation of
the limits of regulation and synchronization with the other small loan laws.
As regards the pawnbroker statutes themselves, the largest defects are the
inadequacy of some of the statutes in preventing the likely abuses, and the
severity of others in dealing with particular aspects of the business. With
but a few exceptions, the general legislative attitude towards pawnbrokers
has been either one of ignorance of their existence (except for purposes of
exacting a heavy license tax), or of reform of their evils resulting in such
severe regulation that they have resorted to the courts for relief. The
former case is by far the most prevalent. This is surprising in view of the
long historical precedent both for the need of regulation and regulation
itself, and because the very jurisdictions which have paid scant attention to
pawnshops have enacted detailed statutes regulating small loan companies.
Why the small loan broker has not resorted to the disguise of the pawn-
broker in these states is not clear. The fact remains that this might be done
and it is evident that the public welfare would best be served by subjecting
both businesses to similar regulations.
The Pennsylvania legislature recognized both the necessity for regu-
lation of pawnbrokers and the equity of harmonizing small loan legislation.
It cannot be denied that they adequately provided for the regulation of
94. Beasley v. Cahoon, io9 Fla. IO6, 147 So. 288 (933) ; People v. Stokes, 281 Il.
159, 118 N. E. 87 (1917).
95. See note 92 supra.
96. In general see cases in HUBACHEK, op. cit. supra note 48, at 37-40, 127, 130.
97. Cole v. Franklin Plan Co., 176 Ga. 561, 168 S. E. 261 (1933) ; Commonwealth
v. Puder, 261 Pa. i29, 1O4 At. 5o5 (ii8).
98. Ravitz v. Steurele, 257 Ky. 1O8, 77 S. W. (2d) 36o (1934).
99. Family Finance Co. v. Allman, 174 Ga. 467, 163 S. E. 143 (1932); People v.
Stokes, 281 Ill. 159, 118 N. E. 87 (917).
ioo. State v. Wickenhoefer, 6 Penne. i2o, 64 At. 273 (Del. 19o6).
Ioi. RABY, op. cit. supra note 7, at 8, 9.
NOTE
pawnbrokers and avoided most of the defects of other statutes. The sec-
tions in the act concerning the pawnbroker's care of the pledge, the sale of
the pledge and the loss of the pawn ticket are fashioned after similar pro-
visions in the Uniform Pawnbroking Bill 0 2 and there is no doubt as to the
legality of their purposes. The licensing and supervision sections and those
specifying the records to be maintained are analogous to corresponding
sections in the Small Loan Act, and like the last named sections would be
held constitutional if they were in issue. With the possible exception of
the interest and charges provision the Pennsylvania act would serve as a
desirable model for future legislation in other states.
The constitutionality of two things in the 1937 small loan legislation in
Pennsylvania is likely to be questioned in the future, for it is not apparent
and it was not conclusively decided by the Equitable Loan Society case.
The first concerns the interest and charges permitted by the Pawnbroker
Act and the second the relation of the Pawnbroker Act to the Consumer
Discount Company Act. The interest and charges section, in establishing a
minimum of eighteen and a maximum of 36 per cent. per annum may be
shown to deny a fair and reasonable return to the pawnshop owner. Upon
conclusive proof of this, it is submitted that sustaining the rates would be
a denial of due process. The obstacle to the production of such evidence
is the statement in the Equitable Loan Society case that because the state
can prohibit the business it may impose confiscatory rates. But since
neither precedent nor logic appear to support this conclusion of the Penn-
sylvania court, it is submitted that evidence as to the reasonableness of the
rates should be allowed.
Even though the rates are held to be reasonable, there remains the
other problem of distinguishing the rates of the Consumer Discount Act.
Cases under the small loan laws indicate that the courts depend more on
policy than logic to uphold collateral statutes. By analogy to them it is
probable that the distinction between consumer discount companies and
pawnbrokers in general would be considered sufficient to justify a classifi-
cation such as that made in the Pennsylvania statutes, even though some
of the particular transactions of both companies could not be differentiated.
If it is believed that allowing a higher rate to consumer discount companies
would not destroy the efficiency of the pawnbroker act, the classification of
the acts would be sustained in the majority of courts.
Even though a suggestion that the provisions of the Uniform Pawn-
broking Bill or the Pennsylvania act be adopted verbatim as law in the
various states would be a futile gesture, it is important to mention a few
essential requirements for effective pawnbroking regulation. First, there is
a definite need for more exacting qualifications for licensees. Secondly, the
administration of licensing and supervision should be placed in the .hands
of a state official or department. Third, detailed records and reports of the
pledges received and the sales made should be required. These three things
are directed at crime prevention and the tracing of stolen goods. Because
crime has been organized on a national scale in recent years, the states
should attempt to enact uniform provisions on these matters to avoid lend-
ing advantage to the criminal by location. For the protection of the pawn-
broker's customer it is suggested fourthly to regulate the interest and
charges of the broker, but allowing the pawnbroker a fair return on the
capital invested. Identical transactions by the pawnbroker and any other
loan broker should be treated alike in the statutes.
P. P. L. III.
io2. Id. at 36.
